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ABSTRACT: 
This essay analyses attitudes towards freedom of choice in theological reflections on sexuality. It explores 
common contradictions that often emerge in such accounts, including: the reaffirmation of disavowed 
simplicity, the affirmation of biological determinism at the expense of interpersonal values, and a distrust of 
choice, which effectively amounts to a choice not to choose. It shows that while conservative Christian sexual 
ethicists often demonise individual freedom of choice, liberal theology often fetishises such freedom. These 
tensions are contrasted with alternative approaches to sexuality, in the form of Rowan Williams’ concept of the 
‘body’s grace’, and Kathleen Roberts Skerrett’s notion of ‘incarnating the other’. The discussion argues that 
contributions of each of these theologians require greater analysis of the contemporary social and cultural forces 
shaping contemporary sexual practices. The essay explores this entwinement between sexuality and the ideal of 
freedom in contemporary culture, through a discussion of Jonathan Franzen’s novel Freedom. 
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- - - - 
 
‘All things are lawful for me, but not all things beneficial’ (1Cor 6: 12) 
 
 Many contemporary theologians lament that Christian sexual ethics is in serious 
disarray. Mainline Christian denominations are tearing themselves apart over disagreements 
about homosexuality; the media publishes a steady stream of accounts of sexual abuse 
committed by clergy; meanwhile, few young church members, let alone most citizens in 
wider society, appear to take seriously church teachings on sex. Sarah Coakley has attributed 
the failure of the churches to address issues surrounding sexuality to three cultural 
contradictions regarding sexual desire. The first is a pervasive pessimism that assumes that 
celibacy is impossible. Coakley notes, however, that such an assertion undermines that 
equally insistent cultural belief that some forms of sexual desire must not be enacted (incest, 
sex with minors, bestiality, etc). The second contradiction is the predominance of feuds over 
the question of homosexual marriage among mainline churches, at the same time that 
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heterosexual marriage is in crisis (rising divorce rates, exponential growth in single-parent 
families, etc). The third contradictory assumption Coakley observes is that celibacy and 
marriage are generally understood to be opposites, ignoring the reality that many marriages 
undergo periods of ‘celibate’ behaviour for a variety of reasons (ill health, physical 
separation, impotence, etc).
1
 
 These perceptive observations shed some light on difficulties relating to the 
articulation of a mature theological ethic of sexuality in the current cultural climate. Yet these 
three contradictions do not directly address some of the Church’s own difficulties in dealing 
with sex. Moreover, the recognition of such contradictions raises the question of how these 
tensions are rooted in the nature of contemporary social arrangements. This essay explores 
the significance of this issue for Christian sexual ethics, while identifying additional 
contradictions inherent to the Church’s own theological reflections on sexuality. These 
include: i) advocating a simplistic sexual ethics after initially acknowledging the complexity 
of sexuality; ii) reducing sexual ethics to biological determinism at the expense of 
interpersonal values; iii) choosing to argue that choice should not be permitted in sexual 
ethics; iv) a liberal fetishising of freedom without sufficiently attending to ways in which 
social context shapes one’s choices. Each of these will be illustrated in turn. 
 Many of the theologians highlighted in this analysis advocate ‘traditional’ or 
‘conservative’ positions. What they share collectively is a criticism of the influence of 
modernity and liberalism on sexual practice, challenging in particular any privileging of 
values such as freedom and choice in sexual ethics. While such a rejection is opposed in this 
essay, at the same time, the discussion acknowledges that these ‘traditional’ critics often 
articulate a deeper sensitivity to the social forces shaping the expressions of contemporary 
sexuality than those ‘liberal’ theologians who celebrate the values of freedom and choice. 
The discussion in the first section of this paper illustrates that while many conservative 
Christian ethicists have a tendency to demonise the freedom of choice, many liberals fetishise 
it. 
  Following this analysis, the essay engages with two promising theological accounts of 
sexuality - those of Rowan Williams and Kathleen Roberts Skerrett – who offer perspectives 
more attentive to the complexity of contemporary sexual ethics. The discussion argues that 
each author helps to enhance the primary theological proposal of the other, although each 
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does not fully address the cultural contradictions shaping contemporary sexuality. Some steps 
in that direction are developed by turning to Jonathan Franzen’s novel Freedom, in the form 
of a theological discussion of its portrayal of the tensions between freedom and sexuality. 
Observing the oscillating nature of desire within the narrative’s main characters illuminates 
that, rather than describing sexual relations as a sacramental means of grace (Williams) or 
analogically in terms of incarnation (Skerrett), the more aspirational nature of prayer serves 
as a more suitable comparison. Such a view reveals how the most appropriate doctrinal 
location for the Christian sexual ethics is eschatology rather than ecclesiology or the doctrine 
of creation. To help demonstrate why this is so, the essay turns first to examples of alternative 
views. 
 
1. Contradictions in Theological Accounts of Sexuality 
 In the face of rising divorce and abortion rates, the proliferation of pornography in 
popular culture, and the questions of same-sex relationships and of trans-gendered identities, 
a number of Christian theologians blame the modern cultural ideal of freedom of choice, and 
such related values as individual self-fulfilment and self-determination, for the failures of 
Christian ethics. For a critic like Stanley Hauerwas, for example, the individualistic ideals of 
Enlightenment liberalism undermine Christian moral values and practices like humility and 
self-sacrifice. In opposition to the dominant cultural ethos in the West, therefore, he insists 
that ‘Christians do not seek to be free but rather to be of use’.2 The result of such a 
perspective with regard to Christian sexual ethics is generally a restriction of sexual 
relationships to the confines of heterosexual marriage. As stated, such a response to the 
challenges of contemporary sexual ethics, however, often contains a number of problematic 
tensions and contractions, which undermine its coherence, not to mention their adoption by 
the majority of the population. Three such contradictions are illustrated in what follows, as 
well as a fourth contradictory tendency commonly found among liberal ethicists.  
 
1.1. Avoiding the dangers of freedom by reaffirming disavowed simplicity  
 One persistent pattern within contemporary Christian theology is an approach that 
begins with an admission that an adequate ethics of sex is impossible in the face of the 
complexity of human sexuality. This is subsequently followed, however, by a straightforward 
reiteration of the view that sex can only be affirmed within the context of heterosexual 
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marriage. Stanley Hauerwas, for example, begins his essay ‘Sex in Public’ with a tone of 
seeming modesty: ‘candor compels me to say that I cannot provide anything like an adequate 
ethic to deal with sex.... Christian ethicists are unsure what to say or how to respond to our 
culture’s changing sexual mores.’3 Just two pages later, however, he affirms as self-evident 
that Christian sexual ethics takes its form within the boundaries of heterosexual marriage 
(with no mention of the fact that the modern form and values of the ‘institution of marriage’ 
are relatively recent cultural conventions).
4
 This dramatic shift leaves the reader with the 
sense that the initial acknowledgement of the complexity of sexuality was rather 
disingenuous. 
 Dennis P. Hollinger initially avoids this contradiction. At the outset of The Meaning 
of Sex, he restricts Christian sex to vaginal insemination within marriage. The book 
concludes, however, with a chapter that can only be described as a lament over the ‘highly 
sexualised nature of contemporary culture’, which he acknowledges the Church has ‘failed 
miserably’ to counter.5 In other words, Hollinger acknowledges the complexity of sexuality at 
the end of his discussion, rather than at the beginning. Yet this admission does not lead to an 
analysis of the causes of the failure of the churches, anymore than it results in a careful 
diagnosis of how it is that western culture has become, as he phrases it, ‘sex-crazed’. As such, 
Hollinger’s engagement with the problem falls short both pastorally and theologically. At the 
practical level, the analysis does not diagnose any particular dynamics influencing 
contemporary attitudes towards sex. Theologically, the argument flirts with Pelagian works 
righteousness, for although he observes that ‘the Church has failed miserably’, it is simply 
told that it must work to become ‘the embodiment of the meaning of sex’.6 One might 
suggest that the Church’s act of confession and self-examination need go further than this 
demand to suddenly embody moral purity in the face of what he himself calls an internal 
crisis. 
 Oliver O’Donovan’s A Conversation Waiting to Begin intends to be a more probing 
and reflective contribution to contemporary sexual ethics. Indeed, O’Donovan recognises that 
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the traditional arguments over sexuality, along with the hermeneutical issues surrounding the 
biblical passages relating to homosexuality, have been repeatedly rehearsed without leading 
to resolution. Moreover, he accepts as a given the presence of homosexual (he does not 
specifically mention bi- or transsexual) Christians within the ecclesia. It is with such a 
constituency, he suggests, that a conversation has yet to begin, for he argues that the status 
and identity of homosexuals in the Church has thus far only been framed through the lens of 
concepts like ‘justice’ or ‘liberation’. According to O’Donovan, until now, what he calls the 
‘Liberal Paradigm’ has been speaking for gay Christians. He intends his volume to be a call 
for gay Christians to articulate for themselves their own understanding of their Christian 
experiences and vocation, in a manner which sets the dialogue ‘within the basic terms set by 
the Christian faith.’7  
 This is the point at which the contradictory pattern often found in Christian sexual 
ethics emerges. After having self-consciously (and charitably) defended the need for an open 
and hospitable conversation over homosexuality, O’Donovan seemingly dismisses out of 
hand the many LGBT Christian organizations that have been existent for decades, along with 
all theological writing published to date by LGBT theologians.
8
 The implication is that those 
gay Christians who have spoken to date have not been sufficiently theologically articulate to 
qualify as dialogue partners. The open invitation to conversation offered with one hand is 
withdrawn by the other when O’Donovan sets the boundaries of what will be recognised as a 
legitimate contribution prior to his debate even beginning. He would have his readers believe 
that, until now, LGBT people have not been speaking for themselves; rather, they have been 
seduced and manipulated by the ‘Liberal paradigm’. This is not to say that one ought not to 
criticise the theological positions of LGBT individuals, but only that it is disingenuous to 
imply that such individuals have yet to speak theologically. Once again, a Christian ethicist 
makes a gesture towards recognizing the complexity of sexuality, only to reassert that the 
situation is actually rather simple. 
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1.2 Affirming biological or contextual determinism at the expense of interpersonal relations 
 Another common pattern in Christian ethical discussions of sexuality is a defence of 
an ethic that restricts sex to vaginal insemination within the confines of marriage, which is 
founded on the biological distinction between male and female. The contradiction comes in 
two forms: first, methodologically, in the sense that a theological position is grounded by an 
appeal to biological givens; second, in the sense that the appeal to empirical biology displaces 
the moral relevance of personal motivations and relationships. An example of the first issue is 
found in the work of Dennis Hollinger, who seeks to ground his ethical approach to sex on 
both revealed morality and natural theology without clarifying how the ‘givens’ of scientific 
findings on sexuality relate to the ‘givens’ of scripture.9  
 For the second problem, Gilbert Meilaender’s position in The Limits of Love is a case 
in point. In a chapter on marriage, he criticises the ‘liberal’ ethics of sexuality typified by 
James Nelson. Meilaender argues that, as Nelson seeks to challenge a perceived dualism 
between body and spirit in Christian understandings of the self, the latter neglects to 
distinguish between duality and dualism.
10
 The result, according to Meilaender, is that 
Nelson’s concepts of ‘mutuality’ and ‘embodiment’ remain terribly vague. The same is true, 
he continues, of Nelson’s criticism of sexist dualism between men and women. The solution 
to the problem of the sexism, Meilaender argues, is not an appeal to vague notions of 
‘communion in love’ in order to overcome gender difference, but is found by affirming the 
value of the duality of the sexes while rejecting dualism: ‘Those joined in a bond of mutual 
love are those who are different – other – and whose individuality is not obliterated or 
merged into undifferentiated oneness.’11 The implication for any consideration of 
homosexuality is clear: ‘Homosexual acts are forbidden precisely because lover and beloved 
are, biologically, not sufficiently other.’12  
 Meilaender’s discussion does helpfully illustrate how vague sentimental concepts like 
‘mutuality’ and ‘communion’ can be when given the task of bearing in themselves the weight 
of an ethic of sexuality. Relevant here, however, is the basis upon which Meilaender 
constructs his account: the particularities of measurable biological difference. But following 
this logic consistently leads to impliction that ethical sexual relations ought not simply to be 
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restricted to those possessing different genitalia, but also different cultural and socio-
economic backgrounds. Why not also specify linguistic difference? The less the couple 
resembles each other, the less likely they are to fall prey to what Meilaender considers to be 
the great sin of sexual relationship: when ‘the relationship approaches too closely the 
forbidden love of self’.13 According to Meilaender, the danger that sexual relationships might 
be reduced to narcissism can be avoided by ensuring that empirical biological difference is 
brought into the equation. That heterosexual relationships do not guarantee such an escape 
from narcissism will be discussed below; the more fundamental issue to note here is the way 
in which biology and empirical difference become the ground of moral theology. 
 Stanley Hauerwas develops an argument similar to that of Meilaender, but rather than 
root his position in biological difference, instead he emphasises the context of the church as 
the determinant of moral sexual ethics. For example, while challenging Nena and George 
O’Neill’s defence of the concept of an ‘open marriage’, Hauerwas argues that they establish 
the depth of one’s commitment to one’s partner as the primary determinant in sexual 
relationships. Such an ethic suggests that what is permitted and what is forbidden ‘should be 
determined by what we feel as individual human beings, not by some predetermined set of 
restrictive codes’.14 Hauerwas argues that this emphasis on trust and freedom encourages a 
certain kind of character: ‘the ideal candidate for an open marriage turns out to be the self-
interested individual presupposed and encouraged by our liberal political structure and our 
capitalist consumer economy.’15 This insight into the fact that the dynamics of capitalism 
shape cultural attitudes towards sexuality is an important one that will be returned to below. 
Here it is instructive to explore the antidote Hauerwas prescribes for the problem he 
diagnoses.  
 According to Hauerwas, the way to interrupt the reduction of sexual relationships to 
self-interested freedom is to assert that marriage ‘is a reality that is prior to love’.16 The 
institution of marriage, he thinks,  provides the structure necessary to shape the character and 
identities of men and women in such a way to enable them to sustain authentic intimate 
relationships. In this way, marriage provides the proper context for sexual relations. Similar 
to Meilaender, Hauerwas criticizes James Nelson for grounding his sexual ethics on abstract 
concepts like ‘faithfulness’. But rather than emphasising biological ‘difference’ as an 
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alternative ground for sexual relationships, Hauerwas focuses on specific practices that he 
thinks are inherent to marriage, emphasising in particular the view that procreation is an 
essential element of sex. Marriage ‘rightly orders’ men and women, and thus it ‘rightly 
orders’ sex. Following Rosemary Haughton, Hauerwas describes Christian marriage as 
‘heroic’ because ‘the couple dedicate themselves, not simply to each other, but to work 
together at something greater than I imagine’.17 To achieve such ‘heroism’, Hauerwas 
continues, requires that couples avoid self-centred considerations, such as whether they are 
‘fulfilled’ in their relationship. He argues that ‘Christians do not believe that love legitimates 
sex or even that sex is an expression of love.’18 Instead, marriage becomes a sign of hope, 
because it is lived in expectation of welcoming in new lives in the form of offspring. On this 
point, Hauerwas pulls no punches, ‘Accordingly it would be appropriate as part of the 
examination of couples desiring to have the Church witness their marriages to have their 
intensions to have children declared.’ 
 The contribution of theologians discussed thus far is how they highlight ways in 
which so-called ‘liberal’ sexual ethics can often revolve around rather vague and sentimental 
concepts, which merely mime the wider culture’s emphasis on individual free choice.19 This 
critique is achieved, however, at the cost of jettisoning the moral significance of any 
relational elements such as joy, gratitude, even love.
20
 This is due to the view dominant 
cultural values like individual choice and freedom need to be challenged by Christian ethics. 
Thus, for these theologians, it is biological identity – conceived of either as ‘difference’, the 
capacity to procreate, or as bodies disciplined by communal practice – that serves as the 
ground for a Christian ethic of sex. In effect, the antidote for individual subjective 
motivations in sexual relationships is to render as morally irrelevant the individual subject as 
anything more than bodily material. Making the subjectivities of the individuals involved in a 
sexual relationship pointless (their motivations, intentions, enjoyment), however, ultimately 
undermines the capacity of such theologies to serve as an ‘ethics’ for contemporary human 
subjects. There is no relational component to such a theology of sex; there is, in effect, no 
sexuality, but mere biological act: vaginal insemination. What remains lacking is substantive 
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concern for relational connection, physical pleasure, or emotional joy. It is sex cleansed of 
the messiness of particular individual human beings. While the arguments above are 
presented as if they are based on a deep respect for embodied reality, this is only possible due 
to the way in which embodied particularity is reduced to either one of two concerns: which 
genitalia the individuals in question have, or whether the proper institutional force is shaping 
embodied experience. 
 At the most basic level, these approaches are not primarily grounded on a Christian 
theological position, in the sense of focusing on biblical treatments of sexuality, or on 
substantive doctrines such as that of creation. The moral arguments of both Meilaender and 
Hauerwas could be accused, in the end, (to use a phrase Hauerwas often employs) of being 
materialist ‘all the way down’. For Meilaender, it is the materiality of empirical biological 
difference that gives moral dignity to sex; according to Hauerwas, it is the character-instilling 
structures of the ecclesial institution of marriage, and it alone, which enables the sex act (in 
the singular) to be grace-filled. It is notable that this is an ethic of sex without a 
pneumatology. For Hauerwas, for example, the ‘church’ (Which church? Whose perspective 
within it?) is the agent assigned as the guardian of sexuality through the institution of 
heterosexual marriage, leaving little space for either a divine or human agent to contribute 
something to the relationship. The extent which his moral theology is grounded on contextual 
determinism is clearly evident in his suggestion that true marriage is not possible within 
capitalism.
21
 It seems that Hauerwas fears that capitalism is capable of entangling even the 
movement of the Spirit when it comes to sexual relationships. To this concern about the 
power of capitalism to shape sexual relationship the discussion now turns. 
 
1.3 Choosing not to Choose: the Demonisation of Choice  
 In the approaches to sexual ethics discussed thus far, considerable critical attention is 
given to illuminating the interconnection between cultural attitudes to sexuality and the 
values of liberal individualism. This is then shown to be closely associated with capitalist 
economies. For Hauerwas, capitalism undermines Christian marriage because it prioritises 
personal self-interest and free choice. Sexuality gets reduced to a contract, he suggests, which 
reduces men and women to erotic consumers who are out simply to accumulate as much 
sexual capital as possible in a competitive market. Oliver O’Donovan’s raises similar 
concerns in his reflections on the ethics of artificial insemination. According to O’Donovan, 
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accepting the use of procreative technology reduces procreation to ‘instrumental means 
chosen by the will’.22 It turns procreation to a ‘product’ of human choice, rather than 
recognise it as an intrinsic good beyond the control of individual self-interest. In this way, the 
technology mimes the cultural values of industrial capitalism. 
 These theologians raise important concerns about the ways in which social context 
influences values and behaviour. Renata Salecl, a Slovenian philosopher and sociologist, has 
analysed the ways in which the structures of liberal capitalism shape human subjectivity and 
culture.
23
 A prominent theme in her writing is the psychological dynamics related to the offer 
of limitless choice, which many imagine is what it means to be ‘free’. Salecl argues that such 
freedom of choice invariably becomes experienced as an encounter with ever new 
prohibitions, which individuals often generate for themselves. The basic dynamic can be 
summarised as follows: the more I am granted freedom of choice, the more I must impose 
self-mastery upon myself in order to ensure that I achieve what it is I want. One example 
from the sphere of sexuality that Salecl explores is taken from contemporary dating 
practices.
24
 She analyses in particular the ‘hook-up’ culture in American colleges and 
universities (and increasingly, one might add, in secondary schools). The phenomenon of the 
‘hook-up’, or casual sexual encounter, can be understood as the evolution of the sexual 
revolution of the 1960s. It essentially has to do with freedom of choice without restrictions 
and prohibitions. Investing much emotional attachment into the equation is considered an 
unnecessary burden and an impediment to total freedom. The paradox that Salecl illustrates, 
however, is that, contrary to this emphasis on choice and control, hook-up culture often 
‘increases feelings of insecurity, anxiety and guilt’.25 Treating sexual partners as disposable 
objects generally leads people to eventually feel disposable themselves. Moreover, if one can 
choose to hook-up, then the expectation becomes that one will in fact ‘hook up’. The freedom 
to choose casual sex becomes the expectation that one will choose casual sex. Those not 
pursuing such relationships (or themselves being pursued) are left to wonder: ‘What’s wrong 
with me?’ Freedom, in such an environment, generates its own anxieties and prohibitions.  
                                                 
22
 Oliver O’Donovan, Begotten or Made? (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 39. 
23
 Some notable representative work includes: Renate Salecl, The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and 
Feminism after the Fall of Socialism (London & New York: Routledge, 1994); (Per)versions of Love and Hate 
(London: Verso, 1998). 
24
 Renata Salecl, The Tyranny of Choice (London: Profile Books, 2011), chapter 3. 
25
 Ibid., 77. 
11 
 
Salecl wants her audience to recognise what many people living in liberal capitalist societies 
often fail to acknowledge: ‘something is always lost when we choose’.26 
 Despite being attentive to some of the challenges with which contemporary culture 
presents to Christian sexual ethics, however, the theologians discussed above argue as if they 
themselves, along with the church, can be free from the dynamics of capitalism and modern 
individualism. One might summarise this approach as an argument that asserts that, by 
choosing not to choose, Christians escape the dilemmas of free choice. This slippage in 
argumentation reveals that important issues remain to be addressed. On this point, an 
observation by Mark Jordon is pertinent. He argues that many Christians rely on stereotypes 
in order to shift the blame for their confusion over sexuality to sources outside of the Church. 
When guilty of this, he counsels, ‘we Christians would do better not to excuse ourselves so 
quickly.’27 This suggests that the question to be asked of the Christian theologians examined 
thus far is: are they too quick to shift the blame for the church’s difficulties over sexual ethics 
to the liberal emphasis on freedom of choice? Here the point is not that the ideal of freedom 
of choice is unproblematic – which Salecl’s analysis clearly challenges – but simply that 
placing the blame on liberal modernity for the failings of Christian sexual ethics is a rather 
convenient scapegoat for the limitations in Christian theology and practice. 
 What distinguishes the Christian ethicists under consideration here is their tendency to 
conclude that rejecting the ideals of freedom and choice is the only antidote for the troubles 
of sexual ethics. Sexual decisions cannot, according to Hauerwas, be left to individual 
Christians, for they display a painful tendency to adopt the corrupting habits of the liberal 
individual. One escapes from this situation by having one’s subjectivity appropriately 
‘trained’ by the Church; ‘In order to know and worship God rightly, we must have our desires 
transformed’ by the practise of the ecclesia.28 Because freedom to choose is problematic, 
Christian sexual ethics needs to provide a firm alternative structure to contain the chaos, be it 
through biological empiricism or ecclesial discipline. 
 Defining Christian sexual ethics in opposition to liberal freedom, however, results in a 
solution that is merely the opposite side of the same coin. The simplistic caricature of the 
traditions of the liberal Enlightenment is challenged by forwarding a simplistic caricature of 
the purity of the Church’s own internal workings. But the inadequacy of this antidote is 
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painfully obvious in a context of ongoing revelations of sexual abuse by clergy. Both 
simplistic narratives (the chaotic external ‘Liberal Paradigm’ and the ‘purity of the Church’) 
shun the difficulties inherent to a mature ethics, which involves discerning how to make 
complex choices, as well as learning to live with the impact of these same choices. 
 Given that choice is unavoidable in sexual ethics, the question of the process and 
operative factors shaping individual choices is an important issue. The sociologist Eva Illouz 
notes that six cultural components, involving both cognitive and emotional processes, shape 
what she calls the ‘architecture of choice’: (i) one’s consideration of the consequences of 
one’s actions, (ii) the process of consultation with relevant authorities, (iii) modes of self-
consultation, (iv) cultural norms of suspicion regarding wants and desires, (v) the accepted 
grounds for making a decision, and (vi) whether choice is valued for its own sake.
29
 Illouz 
observes that the significance as each of these components, along with their specific content, 
has shifted over time. For example, in pre-modern courtship, whatever emotions one had 
about a potential partner had to be organised with particular attention to one’s social and 
economic interests (particularly in the case of women). Social standing, dowries, and 
economic alliances were thus considered primary considerations for selecting partners. What 
has occurred in the modern period, Illouz continues, is an ever-increasing process of dis-
embedding individual romantic choices from the moral and social fabric of established 
traditions and groups, which has resulted in shifting priorities and considerations constituting 
the architecture of choice. 
 Conceived in these terms, one can describe the arguments of Hauerwas, Meilaender 
and O’Donovan as seeking to restrain individual choice regarding sexuality within certain 
parameters, with particular emphasis on church expectations and norms (Illouz’s points (ii) 
and (v)), while challenging modernity’s increasing appreciation of choice as a moral good of 
its own (point vi), and individual preferences and emotions (point iii).The dynamics of choice 
are thus not eliminated from moral reasoning in their work, but only limited in scope. 
 The principal contribution of the work of these theologians is to heighten attention to 
the social location of sexual ethics, and alert Christians to the reality that their choices and 
assumptions occur within the context of their local culture. At the same time, these 
theologians imply that these challenges are essentially external to the Church’s own teaching 
and its membership. Rather than focusing on analysing the numerous challenges 
contemporary Christians must navigate as they operate within the current parameters of 
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modern culture’s architecture of choice, such theologians consistency imply that Christians 
ought to opt out of such dangers by submitting to the disciplining practices of the ecclesia (or 
to the essential nature of their biology) and thus elude the perils of individual decision 
making.  
  
1.4 Fetishising Choice: emphasising the importance of context without critically analysing it 
 If the conservative theologians discussed above fail to offer a convincing response to 
the challenges of contemporary sexual ethics, it is noteworthy that liberal Christian ethicists 
often uncritically adopt the modern celebration of individual freedom, without attending 
sufficiently to the social and cultural tensions found in contemporary sexual practices. 
Mileander and Hauwerwas have already alluded to James Nelson’s privileging of ‘love’ as 
the foundation for Christian sexual ethics, which establishes individual emotional and 
cognitive considerations as the primary components of moral choice.
30
 Such an emphasis on 
the freedom of the individual as normative for sexual ethics is common among liberal 
theologians.
31
 Yet a contradictory tension is often perceptible in such perspectives. As they 
defend the need for theology to take serious account of contemporary culture and context, 
such theologians often uncritically adopt a number of values and assumptions contained 
within this context. Essentially, they do not reflect deeply on their own modern cultural 
context, but simply mime it. Such theology fails to scrutinise the social forces shaping 
individual personal choices. If conservative Christian sexual ethicists often demonise 
individual freedom of choice, liberal theology has a tendency to fetishise such freedom. 
Greater critical scrutiny and social analysis is required on the part of liberal theologians, in 
order to uncover how the current economic and social environment shapes cultural values and 
practices. For example, many sociologists are concerned with the ways in which the concept 
of sexual freedom places a far greater burden on women than men,
32
 and with the fact that the 
very proliferation of choice can often be experienced as disempowering and emotionally 
disorienting.
33
 
 Sarah Coakley calls for an ethics of sex that ceases to be constructed according to a 
simplistic antagonism between freedom and sexual morality; one that moves ‘beyond and 
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through the false modern alternatives of “repression” and “libertinism”.’34 Thus far, the 
discussion in this essay has done much to illustrate why such a goal is required. A Christian 
ethic of sexuality that is adequate to the challenges facing the churches needs to attend to the 
concerns of both poles of this debate. It should recognise the problems inherent to the concept 
of freedom that are articulated by conservative Christian ethicists, but also acknowledge the 
liberal recognition of the contributions of modern culture and of the complexity of individual 
subjectivity. The following section turns to two theologians who make important 
contributions in this latter direction.  
 
2. Towards a Theology of Sexuality 
2.1 The Body’s Grace, Desiring the Other’s Incarnation 
 The article ‘The Body’s Grace’ by Rowan Williams is noteworthy for the consistent 
way that, after admitting that the quest for an adequate sexual ethics is ‘doomed from the 
start’, he then refrains from introducing a simple answer to the problem. Instead, Williams 
turns to analysing why it is that sexuality is so difficult to comprehend and why, as he puts it, 
it ‘matters’.35 To explore this problem, he turns to Paul Scott’s four novels of The Raj 
Quartet, and particularly to the character Sarah Layton, a respectable daughter of a colonial 
official, who tries to live truthfully and generously in the midst of a corrupt and racist regime, 
despite feeling powerless and vulnerable. When she is seduced, her Indian lover observes 
that, ‘You don’t know anything about joy at all, do you?’ She is lost, a young woman in a 
foreign culture where she is viewed as an occupier; she is ‘present fully to no one and 
nothing’. Following the sexual seduction by her partner, however, even though one could not 
say that ‘true love’ was part of the equation, Scott describes a scene in which she looks into 
the mirror and has an epiphany; ‘she had entered her body’s grace’.36 
 For Williams, this narrative is illuminating. Although the story is far from a 
sentimental romance (it includes pregnancy, an abortion, and continued loneliness and 
disappointment), Williams observes that the transformation brought about by Sarah’s 
experience of her ‘body’s grace’ remains deeply resonant and formative. Through her 
sexuality, ‘a frontier had been passed’; she had become ‘present’ to herself in a new way; ‘an 
entry into some different kind of identity’. Even though she continues to be alienated from 
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her surrounding – she still doesn’t really belong – she feels a new confidence in herself and 
of value. Despite the messiness and complexity of her sexual experience, Williams thus 
perceives a profound significance and depth. The result is a perspective on sex which – far 
from focusing on biological givens, or on a regime of power that exclusively shapes 
individual subjectivity – is prepared to be surprised by sexuality’s capacity to transform a life 
with lasting effect. Williams links this with a spiritual experience, ‘Grace, for the Christian 
believer, is a transformation that depends in large part on knowing yourself to be seen in a 
certain way: as significant, as wanted.’ 
 This emphasis on how the body can be the cause of happiness highlights the 
superabundance of sexuality, which surpasses the more immediate and tangible ‘productions’ 
of sex, be they reproduction, strengthening communal bonds, even pleasure. Williams 
highlights a deeper and more intimate function of sexuality. Being desired, one gets caught 
up in a dynamic similar to that outlined in the stories of creation, incarnation and 
incorporation into the fellowship of the Body of Christ. According to Williams, this narrative 
‘tells us that God desires us, as if we were God’. This desiring of a human creature becomes 
the cause of another’s desire; ‘we are pleased because we are pleasing’.37 Such a location of 
sexual expression within the horizon of divine grace is what Sarah experiences in the Raj 
Quartett. Her sexual experience is complicated – both pleasurable and disappointing – yet at 
the core of her sexual life is an experience of acceptance and gift, which transcends the 
dominating regimes and external forces shaping her life (patriarchy, colonialism, racism, and, 
yes, capitalism). 
 Williams labours to head-off the possible misunderstanding that such a perspective 
opens the door to narcissistic self-love, of the kind that concerns Hauerwas, Meilaender and 
O’Donovan. He thus emphasises how the movement of desire he describes is dependent upon 
being recognised by the object of desire. It is not simply that Sarah feels herself to be graced; 
she feels graced by being desired by the lover. Williams thus concludes: ‘this means that in 
sexual relation I am no longer in charge of what I am.... I cannot of myself satisfy my wants 
without distorting or trivializing them.’ This suggests that ‘distorted sexuality’ is what 
emerges when one attempts to maintain control over one’s own happiness and joy, and 
through refusing to risk permitting one’s body to be seen in the light of the other’s 
perception. Such a distortion, in the form of refusal to accept a loss of control by the 
individual ego, results in the form of self-love that Hauerwas and his colleagues are quite 
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right to warn against. When one person controls another without regard for the other’s desire, 
then the sexual relation, according to Williams, cannot be grace-filled. 
 When one recognises this dynamic, Williams continues, one understands that 
decisions about sexuality are fundamentally decisions about how one engages with the body 
in making sense of the world. Conventional heterosexual marriage is a context in which this 
is often nurtured. But because marriage is such a cultural convention, it is easy for Christians 
not to recognise the underlying fundamental nature of sexuality, for they simply follow the 
one conventional option available to them. What is noteworthy about homosexual 
relationships, according to Williams, is the way in which they highlight the question of the 
meaning of desire. Lacking the self-evident utilitarian function of reproduction, same-sex 
relationships bring immediately into view the dynamics of desire present in all embodied 
relationships. 
 Kathleen Skerrett has written appreciatively on Williams’ essay, but she places 
additional emphasis on the object of one’s desire. Drawing from Roger Scrutin’s suggestion 
that sexual desire is not so much directed toward another’s body, but rather towards her or his 
consciousness, Skerrett argues that, ‘In erotic longing, one desires another’s incarnation’.38 
She emphasises the notion that sexual desire entails mutual kenosis: ‘I want to be poured out 
incarnate in response to the reciprocal pouring out of the other toward me.’ Both she and 
Williams thus focus on the inter-subjective nature of sexual relations. The imagery Williams 
employs highlights how the individual subject experiences ‘grace’ by being desired. 
Skerrett’s theological metaphor focuses attention on the ‘gracing’ of the other. Whereas the 
concept of the ‘body’s grace’ emphasises the individual’s own sense of being of 
incommensurable value, the idea of ‘desiring the other’s incarnation’ evokes a deep 
connection to another consciousness.  
 Together, both of these accounts restore moral dignity to relational qualities such as 
joy, pleasure, and honesty. As shown above, these elements are often marginalised in 
Christian sexual ethics. But it is precisely at this point that conservative theologians might 
interject and argue that Williams and Skerrett are simply following a path well-worn by 
liberal theologians. Such an accusation might be constructed in the following manner: after 
acknowledging that the dynamics of sexual desire are complicated and messy, is sexual desire 
now being presented as the solution to the messiness? In other words, is the cause of the 
disease also being presented as the cure? Andrew Cameron, for example, asks whether the 
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interpretation of Sarah’s experience offered by Williams is ‘fatalistic’? Cameron notes that 
Williams does not provide any basis to hope that Sarah might ‘know “the body’s grace” in 
the best possible way’ – i.e. without fear that betrayal or rejection might undo the logic of 
grace.
39
 Such a challenge asks whether Williams neglects the darker elements of sexual 
desire. Human desires can often be in conflict, and sexual experiences not only have the 
capacity to fill one with a sense of grace, but also with profound grief, pain, and devastation. 
The desire of the other might lead one to experience ‘the body’s grace’, but all too often its 
encroachment brings alienating objectification – becoming more dis-incarnating that 
incarnating. 
 Such criticism admittedly reveals some gaps in the accounts of Skerrett and Williams. 
Nevertheless, the accusation that they idealise sexual desire is exaggerated. Skerrett, for 
example, has criticised versions of feminist theology that neglect what she calls the ‘tragic 
view of eros’.40 Such disregard, she says, occurs when a theological ethic is constructed on 
the basis of a sentimental concept of erotic ‘right-relation’. She also criticises relational 
categories like ‘mutuality’ when they are described as having the capacity to dissolve the 
boundary between self and other. For example, when Beverly Harrison and Carter Heyward 
employ the concept of ‘erotic power’, they argue the following: ‘Even some of the most 
subtle feminist theory has not yet adequately repudiated the association of eroticism with the 
split between self and other that is endemic to the patriarchal view of reality.’41 Against this 
call for the elimination of boundaries, Skerrett argues that it is necessary to recognise that 
desires between different individuals can often be in conflict. As one learns in the Raj 
Quartet, not everyone that Sarah desires will desire her back. In When Boundaries Betray Us, 
however, Heyward argues that her therapist’s refusal to accept a sexual relationship with her 
was the result of the therapist’s refusal of ‘mutuality’. 42 In response, Skerrett suggests that 
Heyward is denying her therapist the right to not to return her desire. By contrast, Skerrett 
argues that a ‘tragic’ understanding of eros recognises that ‘renunciation – bearing the no of 
the beloved – is not antisensual aestheticism: it is one of the positive disciplines of love’.43 
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Thus, far from advocating a sentimental understanding of sexual relations, Skerrett is 
sensitive to the difficulties and tensions inherent to them. Williams offers similar caution 
when he acknowledges that, ‘Nothing will stop sex from being tragic and comic.’44 One 
might be rejected, betrayed, disappointed, or simply made to look foolish. 
 Far from being naive and sentimental about sexual desire, Williams and Skerrett are 
alert to the dangers and risks inherent to it. To acknowledge this humbles any impulse to 
romantically over-estimate the relational power of sexuality. A caution Williams offers in 
another context about the use of the concept ‘incarnation’ is relevant here. While criticising 
the idealisation of the ‘incarnational principle’ in Anglican theology, he argues that over-
emphasising the fusion of heaven and earth results in ‘slippage into ideology’.45 Such a 
problem emerges when talk of God’s presence suggests that the divine is immediately 
accessible and knowable. This arises when one equates divine grace with sexual relations as 
such, or when it is suggested that a feeling of intimacy is equivalent to the fullness of divine 
presence.  
 While neither Skerrett nor Williams engage in such mystification, one can understand 
why theologians like Hauerwas, Meilaender and O’Donovan are nervous when human and 
divine action are spoken of as operating intimately within human relationships. Perhaps it is 
for this reason that Williams has subsequently distanced himself from his essay ‘The Body’s 
Grace’ (although, significantly, without dismissing it).46 Although this equivocation may 
simply be due to the fact that he was subsequently serving as Archbishop of Canterbury in the 
midst of an intense dispute over homosexuality within the Anglican Communion, he also 
subsequently offered a theological point of clarification: ‘Ethics is not a matter of a set of 
abstract rules, it is a matter of living the mind of Christ. That applies to sexual ethics; that is 
why fidelity is important in marriage.’47 
 This reference to the mind of Christ is a significant one for a Christian ethics of sex, 
but what it means is not immediately straightforward. At first glance, the reference to 
Christological doctrine appears to offer greater concrete particularity than Skerrett’s poetic 
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deployment of the concept of ‘incarnational’ relationship. The statement could be read as 
resonating with Hauerwas’ concern that Christian ethics be conceived in terms of the 
Christian narrative story rather than as grounded in moral ‘principles’. It would be a mistake, 
however, to reduce William’s reference to ‘the mind of Christ’ to some precise ‘practice’ or 
‘grammar’ that human subjects are to mimetically repeat in a straightforward manner. 
Skerrett’s work helps one appreciate why this is so. On the challenge of living within the 
constraints of moral decision making, she writes, ‘The tenderness and excruciations of 
finitude are something you can only learn by living them, not by hearing about them.’48 In the 
same way, Williams’ care in defending the moral task of living the mind of Christ, rather than 
merely copying or adhering to Christ’s ‘mind’ (as if such a thing were accessible to the 
Christian), is to be understood as a mode of aspirational seeking – or, better, patient awaiting 
– rather than as a specific programme of obedience. Mark Jordan captures this spirit when he 
notes: ‘revelation teaches in ways that bureaucracy cannot’.49 
 Framed doctrinally, at stake is the classic distinction between justification and 
sanctification. The church undertakes the former practically through grateful reception of free 
grace; the latter is often sought through teaching instruction. Is a Christian ethic of sex 
primarily to be approached as a pedagogical matter, for which the Church’s principal calling 
is to engage in instruction and formation, or is the more fundamental task for moral theology 
to recognise and give thanksgiving for the revelatory gift that is received and grasped in 
terms of the ‘body’s grace’? For Hauerwas in particular, but also for Meilaender and 
O’Donovan, sexuality is a matter for which the Church must offer distinctive teaching and 
disciplined formation. The church and its ‘practices’ (or ‘institutions’) shape and give proper 
form to sexuality. Williams and Skerrett, however, without discounting the power of 
embodied practice, focuses instead on the elements of surprise, gift, and interruption in 
human sensual experience. For them, human sexuality, in the sense that it involves embodied 
response to another, is precisely the vehicle through which human beings encounter God’s 
revelation. 
 
2.2  Sexuality and Prayer 
 It is noteworthy to observe how, when wrestling with sexual ethics, both Mark Jordan 
and Sarah Coakley turn to a discussion on the nature of prayer. Jordan observes, for example, 
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how the phenomenology of prayer closely resembles that of erotic relationships. Both involve 
fluctuations in one’s sense of intimacy and connection. The intensity of one’s presence to the 
other – be that either to God or to the beloved – wax and wane in creaturely life. This reality 
is due to the nature of human finitude, but more precisely, Jordan understands it as being 
related to the fact that all forms of intimacy are construed in relation to power.
50
 Human 
creatures continually struggle to maintain the difficult balance between self-control and being 
receptive of what lies beyond their mastery. This leads to constant fluctuations of reaching 
out and pulling way – the wax and wane of intimacy – so that one’s love cannot be fully 
possessed or integrated into the self. 
 Coakley describes prayer and contemplation in a similar manner, arguing that prayer 
is only empowering when one ceases to set the agenda and ‘make space’ for God to be God.51 
This is a mode of engagement on the part of the subject which does not insist on domination 
or control, while at the same time avoiding the mere adoption of vulnerable powerlessness or 
meek submission. For Coakley, this form of ‘spiritual practice’, which is dedicated to 
‘attending to the other’, sheds light on the ways in which institutions and others ‘discipline’ 
us, without neglecting the fact that we also ‘have the power to discipline ourselves’.52 She 
develops this line of thinking to describe the Christian life as a life-long process involving the 
purification and redirection of desire towards the divine. This fosters an ‘eschatologically-
oriented’ subjectivity that seeks to be ever more transformed into the divine life.53 Here one 
observes the theological distinction between justification and sanctification being brought 
back into harmony in the practices of prayer and contemplation. Skerrett helps clarify how 
this is so in relation to sexual desire:  
 the lived experience of sexual desire redresses our political accounts of autonomy. I 
 am immediately constrained by my “choice” of object at levels that prodigally exceed 
 my intentions. One does not choose an object of sexual desire; one suffers desire for 
 the other, the way one suffers grief. Did I “consent” to this?54 
This reflection on the nature of sexuality offers a more sophisticated and illuminating 
approach to contemporary Christian sexual ethics than do the writings of Hauerwas, 
O’Donovan and Mileander, particularly with regard to the question of human agency and 
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freedom. Yet, although Skerrett and Williams avoid the liberal tendency to idealise individual 
freedom of choice, there is a sense in which their careful attention to the phenomenological 
dynamics of inter-personal relationships remain somewhat two-dimensional. They have 
shifted the discussion away from a subjective individualism to one more that is alert to 
intersubjective relationality.  What remains to be done is further analysis of the social and 
cultural forces shaping individuals as the exercise their freedom (which, in their essays on 
sexuality, neither Williams nor Skerrett discuss in any great detail). Some initial reflection in 
this direction is supported by turning to a narrative account that illustrates the importance of 
including such considerations in sexual ethics. 
 
3. Freedom of Choice, Sexuality, and Capitalism 
 The complicated connections between sexuality, love, the freedom to choose, and 
contemporary culture are at the heart of Jonathan Franzen’s novel Freedom.55 The book 
focuses on a contemporary middle class American family: Patty and Walter Berglund, and 
their two children Joey and Jessica. The narrative follows how each of the characters runs 
headlong into the deep contradictions and painful tensions inherent to the freedom of choice, 
and it explores how these issues impact on their most intimate relationships.  
 The complexity of love and sexuality emerge at the very outset of the relationship 
between Patty and Walter. Patty isn’t initially attracted to Walter when she meets him in 
college, but to his more dynamic roommate Richard. When Patty does begin a relationship 
with Walter, she often finds him tedious and routine, but she is also profoundly affected by 
how she feels perceived by him: he had ‘a blind faith in her goodness which ... she had rather 
desperately come to count on’ (120). Throughout her life, Patty is free to choose between 
various possible partners, but she does not know how to make good choices.  
 A common pattern thus emerges in the novel. Patty is attracted to Walter because of 
his intense admiration of her; her son Joey begins a sexual relationship with his neighbour 
Connie largely because she is completely devoted to him, and Walter is seduced by his 
assistant Lalitha, who he believes to be ‘the one person who wanted him without 
qualification’ (465). The narrative illustrates how, when sexual desire is rooted in this kind of 
dynamic, it inevitably begins to wane. While initially Patty is excited by seeing herself in the 
image that Walter has of her, she continually feels plunged back into her ‘unpretended true 
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self’ (107). Try as she might to be free of her past, her less attractive qualities, and her own 
unresolved emotional difficulties, these issues cannot be buried forever, even when they 
remain invisible to Walter’s adoring gaze. She is never really able to believe that Walter 
loves her for who she ‘truly’ is. Her son Joey is involved in a similar situation with Connie. 
He both enjoys the attentions of Connie’s ‘boundless capacity for idolatrous love’, but also 
considers it too intense and misplaced (288). Likewise, when Lalitha kisses Walter with 
‘more desire for him in her mouth than in Patty’s entire body’ (336), it initially fills him with 
an intense feeling of joy; however, he soon finds that although ‘he now had what he wanted, 
...it was making him lonely’ (467). What is clear in the lives of these characters is that desire 
is far from a reliable compass for moral discernment or the achievement of happiness. 
 Such oscillations of desire are at the core of Franzen’s examination of freedom. 
Connie tells Joey that he should feel free to sleep with other women while he is away at 
college, but when he does he feels like he has betrayed both himself and his girlfriend. He 
himself is consumed by jealousy when Connie begins to have sex with another man. The 
closer he gets to the object of his fantasy – the beautiful Jenna – the more miserable he 
becomes. Jenna, he realises, ‘didn’t understand love’ but simply measured her life in terms of 
money and cultural status (408). Joey rebels against his parents, and initially against Connie, 
determined to be free to do whatever he wants, only to discover that he ‘didn’t know what to 
do, he didn’t know how to live’ (318). 
 This narrative thus interrupts tendencies to celebrate both the capacity of passionate 
desire to achieve right-relationship, but also the notion that firm discipline and authority 
resolve the tensions of sexuality. Regarding the former tendency, Patty laments how her brief 
affair with Richard made her miserable: ‘I’ve spent three years wanting a thing I knew would 
never make me happy. But it didn’t make me stop wanting it’ (375). Regarding the second 
tendency, the more Patty and Walter try to influence and shape Joey’s life, the more he 
aggressively rebels and longs to be ‘free’. Many of his choices simply become motivated by 
his determination to choose the opposite of what his parents represent. 
 The dynamics of these relationships resonate with Skerrett’s recognition that ‘choice’ 
often exceeds one’s intentions. It also recalls Williams’ observation that desire is a 
phenomenon that can interrupt and surprise the subject. These two theologians emphasise the 
positive and life-giving potentials of this dimension of sexuality, even as they acknowledge 
the tragic risks it entails. Franzen’s portrait of the Berglund family deepens this trajectory by 
illuminating how the dynamics of desire can elude the control and even awareness of 
individual subjects. Moreover, the novel demonstrates ways in which consumer capitalism 
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has become intertwined with contemporary cultural understandings of sex. Franzen portrays 
this in a rant by Richard as he describes some of his music groupies: ‘Me me me, buy buy 
buy, party party party’ (202). Walter adds a political dimension to this: ‘Capitalism can’t 
handle talking about limits, because the whole point of capitalism is the restless growth of 
capital’ (361). The novel suggests that the impermanence and constant flux of capitalism 
shape the exercise of individual freedom in profound ways, encouraging impatience, self-
centeredness, and temporary relationships.  
 When Patty visits her daughter’s college, she reads the institutional motto on the wall, 
Use Thy Freedom Well (184). But the novel shows how difficult it is for any of the main 
characters to live either freely or well. They all resent the limits and frustrations they 
experience in their lives. At the same time, they find moments of apparent free choice to be 
disorienting and disappointing. Illouz notes that such experiences are a common feature of 
contemporary sexuality: ‘Suffering in contemporary intimate interpersonal relationships 
reflects the situation of the self in conditions of modernity’.56 Franzen’s narrative shows how, 
over time, the main characters learn to cope with their constraints and disappointments. They 
must come to appreciate that part of this task involves unlearning some of the cultural 
conditioning they have received, as well as resisting social pressures to act in certain ways. 
 At the heart of the novel is the troubled relationship between Patty and Walter. Patty 
often finds sex with Walter unexciting, partially due to his gentle attentiveness (which is 
paradoxically one of the things she loves him for). Meanwhile, she burns with desire for 
Richard. Over time, as Walter’s patience with Patty’s frustrated state wears thin, he finds the 
desire that Lalitha has for him energizing. When Patty admits her brief affair with Richard to 
Walter, he uses this as an excuse to exile her from his life. Patty is then “free” to be with 
Richard, and Walter is “free” to enjoy his new life with Lalitha. What the novel demonstrates 
is that such escapes to the fantasy of sexual bliss are not possible. For Walter, ‘it didn’t feel 
like liberation, it felt like death’ (480). 
 The breakthrough for both characters comes when each is able, not only to see 
themselves for who they truly are, but also to accept this. This is matched by a new capacity 
to perceive the other clearly for who they are, and to nevertheless love them. This 
achievement does not come easily. The first movement in this direction occurs when Walter 
discovers Patty’s personal journal. When Walter reads it, even though this results in 
considerable pain for all involved (and also in the breakup of the marriage), the event enables 
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a new level of truthfulness to enter into their relationship. It takes some time for Walter to 
absorb the impact of these discoveries, aided by criticism he receives from his daughter. He 
admits that he must also engage in some self-critical exploration, and determine whether he is 
becoming ‘another overconsuming white American male who felt entitled to more and more 
and more’ (318).  
 These events prepare the ground for a breakthrough in the drama, but what finally 
enables it is Patty’s refusal to give up on the relationship. She recognises her own failings in 
the wake of the death of her father, as she realises that her own ‘dream of creating a fresh life, 
entirely from scratch, entirely independent, had been just that: a dream’ (514). Accepting this, 
she experiences a change in herself. She is able to let go of her fantasy of an endlessly 
exciting life with Richard, as well as her resentment of the disappointments she has suffered. 
She rediscovers what she loves about Walter – his capacity to love nature and the world 
around him – and so resolves to go to him and share her feelings. When he initially refuses to 
speak to her, she waits, patiently but stubbornly, outside his door. She realises that the 
situation is beyond here control, and so she simply waits. The climax of the novel occurs 
when Walter finally resolves to hear her out, and the result captures the importance of a 
changed mode of perception:  
And so he stopped looking at her eyes and started looking into them, returning their 
look before it was too late, before this connection between life and what came after 
life was lost, and let her see all the vileness inside him, all the hatreds of two thousand 
solitary nights, while the two of them were still in touch with the void in which the 
sum of everything they’d ever said or done, every pain they’d inflicted, every joy 
they’d shared, would weigh less than the smallest feather on the wind. 
 “It’s me,” she said. “Just me.” 
 “I know,” he said, and kissed her. (559, emphasis added) 
This scene brings additional nuance into the discussion that Williams and Skerrett have about 
Sarah’s experience in the Raj Quartet. With regard to the sense of the ‘body’s grace’, one 
might describe Walter and Patty as experiencing the gift of presence to each other. They 
experience – finally – the grace of mutual recognition and acceptance. Rather than simply 
looking at Patty, Richard sees more deeply into her – beyond his own subjective assumptions 
and needs. As was the case with Sarah in Raj Quartet, this is a momentary achievement, but 
it is clear that it will have lasting impact, for the difficult past that this couple has shared is 
not being repressed or forgotten in this moment of union, but is accepted and remains 
constitutive of their own individual identities. Patty feels recognised for who she really is by 
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Walter, and Walter experiences, for the first time, the fullness of Patty’s offer of herself to 
him. They are finally present to each other in a way not mediated by illusory fantasies. The 
previous turmoil over their conflicted desires, disappointments, jealousies and bitterness no 
longer hold power over their relationship. In this encounter, Walter and Patty have finally 
learned how to make space for each other in themselves. They have weathered the 
‘excruciations of finitude’ (Skerrett) by achieving a more mature self-understanding, as well 
as an openness and genuine appreciation of each other. Rather than having their relationship 
shaped primarily by the fears and frustrations of the past, or by the pressures and demands of 
the present, they are now able to discern one another anew, and begin to discover a new 
identity. They are now beginning to define themselves by their future, which still lies ahead 
of them. As such, it can be described as an eschatological interruption of their previous 
selves. 
 In a cultural environment in which sexuality is often framed according to clear and 
straightforward priorities — freedom of self-expression, a natural morality based on 
biological anatomy, or an emphasis on the discipline of an institutional ‘pastoral power’ — 
Franzen’s novel illustrates the perils and inadequacies of each of these perspectives. The 
experiences of Walter and Patty demonstrate that the ideal of ‘Using Well Thy Freedom’ 
involves discovering a delicate balance between power and submission. The absence of 
power is alienating and leads to a desperate scramble for control, while absolute autonomy 
undermines itself. When Walter realises that ‘He and his wife loved each other and brought 
each other daily pain’ (325), the novel shows that there is no escape from this situation. 
Simply splitting up or merely staying together does not resolve the problem. The only 
possible resolution is confronting and working through the dilemma, and even then it comes 
only as a surprising gift. Sexuality is shown to be a key dimension to working through these 
dynamics, but at the same time the novel illustrates how fraught a field it is to navigate. 
 These observations suggest that sexual ethics is best thought of, not in terms of static 
categories, but in aspirational terms. While concepts like ‘right-relation’ and ‘mutuality’ can 
possibly serve as useful signposts, the complexity of sexual relationships cannot be reduced 
to these, for reasons that critics like Hauerwas and Meilaender have demonstrated. Against 
such critics, however, it should be recognised that the proper ‘end’ of sexuality can only be 
realised as a gift. This is undermined when one attempts to rigidly control or manipulate it. 
The most appropriate doctrinal location for the Christian sexual ethics is thus eschatology 
rather than ecclesiology or the doctrine of creation. Sexual relations do serve the wider 
community, but they are not simply for the community. Similarly, while one’s understanding 
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of sexuality is informed by one’s understanding of humanity and its place in the cosmos, its 
end is not found merely by conforming to one’s present understanding of one’s nature. 
Rather, sexuality involves a process of discovering one’s own nature in response to that of 
another. The fullness of one’s identity, but also the fullness of one’s relationship to another, 
are yet to be fully discovered. 
This is why Jordan’s suggestion that prayer is an analogy for sexuality is instructive. 
Prayer requires time; it cannot be reduced to mere gratification. While it involves discipline, 
it also seeks after something that cannot be planned for or reduced to technique. The life of 
prayer requires self-reflexive examination and confession, as well as open attention to the 
presence of another. In his book Lost Icons, Williams describes loving relationships that are 
able to transcend the self-absorption of psychological transference (the mistaken idea that 
another person possesses something that will heal or complete oneself). He suggests such 
successful relations move around ‘the non-existent third term’.57 This sense of a ‘third’ 
element in relationships is an experience that remains elusive and superabundant. It is an 
experience of ‘self that is present neither to my own unmediated self-awareness or self-
examination nor simply to the desiring other’. The lover’s identity exceeds her or his own 
control, but also of the control of the beloved. Christians can understand this ‘third 
dimension’ of relationality in terms of the gift of the Spirit.  
It is for this reason that descriptions of sexual relations as a sacramental means of 
grace (which is how some interpret William’s concept of the ‘body’s grace’) or in terms of 
the incarnation (following Skerrett) require further elaboration. Franzen’s novel has helped 
illustrate that the power of erotic relationships can be distorted by the social and cultural 
forces that shape them. Thus, in order for sexual relations to experience that grace which 
Williams and Skerrett have so eloquently described, the individuals involved need to have 
their own agendas and desires interrupted by something beyond them. This is to say that 
sexual relations as such are not inherently transformative or life-giving. Missing this fact 
leads to the sentimentality that Hauerwas and Meilaender criticise.  
The ‘third dimension’ of human relationships illuminates the path sought by Coakley 
between the dynamics of power and domination. The restlessness of the characters in 
Franzen’s novel resonates with Augustine’s observation that human hearts are restless until 
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they find their rest in their eschatological home.
58
 A successful relationship is thus one that 
lives out of a promise of completeness that is yet to be. It requires a trust in what is not yet 
fully known and remains beyond control. Patty and Walter’s broken relationship is mended 
only after they both relinquished full control over themselves. Having had their illusions 
about themselves and about each other crumble, they are now in the position to have their 
previous ways of being together interrupted by the surprising gift of a transformative and 
ecstatic love. As the narrative makes clear, this breakthrough is achieved largely despite their 
own efforts. It is not a manufactured reconciliation, but a work of grace. It is the 
pneumatological and eschatological resonance of this ‘third dimension’ of relationality that 
contemporary Christian sexual ethics is often lacking. 
Thus, although church teaching and saintly models may help Christians to achieve 
‘rightly channelled desire’,59 there is no fool-proof way on this side of the eschaton to control 
the fluidity of human desires or avoid the inherent difficulties of navigating the architecture 
of choice. As Patty’s and Joey’s experiences illustrate, often the attempt to rigidly control 
desire only becomes its very stimulus. Achieving true attentiveness to the other’s presence, 
and to oneself, takes time. This is the reason that faithfulness, understood as the giving of 
unlimited time to another, is so important for a moral understanding of sex. It is such 
faithfulness, not in the name of ‘procreation’ or ‘natural order’, but offered as part of the 
attempt to be attentive to the presence of the other, which stands in stark contrast to ‘hooking 
up’ culture and the frenzied consumerist consumption of contemporary capitalist social 
patterns.   
As Walter reflects on the life of his troubled grandfather, who had immigrated to the 
USA from Sweden in search of boundary-less opportunity, he observes how ‘The personality 
susceptible to the dream of limitless freedom is a personality also prone, should the dream 
ever sour, to misanthropy and rage’ (445). Heeding this caution in the sphere is sexuality is 
difficult in the context of western culture’s hyper-preoccupation with sex. Yet this is also a 
warning that helps one recognise that the promise of grace is found, not by transcending the 
limitations and disappointments encountered in human relationships and their inherent 
choices, but by working through them. This is the dynamic Paul wrestles with as he seeks to 
help the Corinthians understand why the freedom found in God’s grace ought not to be 
mistaken as licence to live without regard for consequence or for the concerns of others. 
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While all things might be lawful, not all things are beneficial (1 Cor 6.12; 10.23). This 
statement only seems trite and empty when one neglects the depth of the question of what is 
truly beneficial for one’s life. Similarly, Paul’s remark can only strike one as instrumentally 
straightforward if one ignores the contradictory and oscillating nature of human desire. Thus, 
contemporary Christian sexual ethics ought not to demonise individual human freedom; nor 
should it uncritically adopt contemporary culture’s fetishised celebration of sexual liberty. 
Rather, the challenge confronting the churches is the question of how to help Christian 
individuals learn to navigate the many competing influences on their thoughts and desires, 
and to model a form of prayerful discernment that seeks after the mind of Christ. Deepening 
our understanding of the pneumatological and eschatological resonances of the ‘third 
dimension’ of relationality is a step in this direction. 
